BUSINESS MODEL INNOVATION – A GAMBLE OR A MANAGEABLE PROCESS? by Taran, Yariv et al.
Journal of Business Models (2019), Vol. 7, No. 5, pp. 90-107
90
Business Model Innovation – A Gamble or a Manageable  
Process?
Yariv Taran1, René Chester Goduscheit2 and Harry Boer3
Abstract
Purpose: Any business model innovation process involves a certain level of uncertainty, complexity and, in effect, 
risk. A sloppy approach towards the management of risk may result in catastrophic, sometimes even fatal, con-
sequences to a company’s core business. Although risk, risk appetite and risk management are relatively well-
established concepts, their role in business model innovation is not well understood. The objective of this paper is to 
investigate how the risk associated with the innovativeness of a business model innovation, an organization’s risk 
appetite, and its risk management approach interact to affect the success or failure of a business model innovation 
process.
Design: Retrospective case studies of business model innovations undertaken by three industrial companies pro-
vide the empirical basis for this paper. These companies were selected based on their relatively successful, yet 
somewhat different, business model innovation experiences over the years, and focused on the, in total four, cases 
in which they failed to implement their new business model attempts successfully. The reasons that led to these 
failures are discussed.
Findings: Important factors explaining the business model innovation failure of these cases, appear to be the com-
pany’s risk appetite, the risk associated with the radicality, reach and complexity of the business model innovation, 
the company’s awareness of these risks and their management, and especially the association between these fac-
tors.
Originality: There are many lessons to be learned from the aftermath of a failed attempt in terms of what not to do 
and what to improve a next time. The cross-case analysis produced six testable propositions that enhance our un-
derstanding of business model innovation success/failure, with particular focus on the characteristics of the busi-
ness model innovation, overall innovation management, risk, risk awareness, risk appetite and risk management, 
and the interaction and fit between these six constructs.
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Introduction
Business model innovation is risky business. Many 
business model innovation attempts result in an inno-
vation failure (e.g. Christensen, Bartman and Van Bever 
2016). Especially if a company follows a first mover 
strategy, arguing from a “no risk no reward” aphorism, 
a sloppy implementation approach towards business 
model innovation may result in catastrophic or even 
fatal consequences to the company’s core business 
(e.g. Taran 2011). Thus, managers should recognize that 
taking risks, while at the same time controlling them, 
is fundamental to the successful development and 
implementation of a sustainable business model. How-
ever, although there is a considerable body of literature 
on risk management, particularly in relation to project 
management (e.g., Chapman and Ward 2004; Kend-
rick 2003) and product innovation management (e.g., 
Keizer, Halman and Song 2002); Keizer and Halman 
2007), it has not yet been fully incorporated into other 
core business decision-making processes (Deloitte 
ERM survey 2008), including business model innova-
tion. This paper seeks to enhance the understanding 
of the potential interaction between risk, risk appetite 
and risk management in the context of business model 
innovation.
Literature Review
Risk, Risk Management and Risk Appetite
The term risk refers to “uncertainty of outcome” (Chap-
man and Ward 2004). Risk management has been 
defined as “the systematic application of management 
policies, procedures and practices to the tasks of com-
municating, consulting, establishing the context, iden-
tifying, analyzing, evaluating, treating, monitoring and 
reviewing risk” (ISO/IEC Guide 73 2003).
Although companies have successfully adopted risk 
management in their internal audit, treasury, insur-
ance, health and safety, and legal functions, it has 
not yet been fully incorporated into core business 
processes related to future growth, such as strategic 
planning, capital allocation, and performance manage-
ment (Deloitte & Touche 2008). This seems to imply 
that unrewarded risks, in the sense that no premium 
is obtained from managing them – only the poten-
tial for loss is reduced, are the main driver in today’s 
risk management practices. Apparently, managing 
rewarded risks, which are part and parcel of decision-
making processes associated with future growth, is not 
yet fully embedded in organizational change and inno-
vation processes, including business model innovation. 
Furthermore, even if companies attempt to manage 
rewarded risks systematically, for example, in pro-
ject management (e.g. Kendrick 2003; Chapman and 
Ward 2004) or product innovation management (e.g. 
Keizer and Halman 2007), they essentially assume 
that those risks can be managed in isolation from the 
rest of the system. Organizations tend to perceive 
risk merely in terms of technical and market uncer-
tainty and not in terms of a more comprehensive 
understanding of the organization and the resources 
that are available (Dillon, Lee and Matheson 2005). 
Recent surveys and studies (e.g. Taplin 2005; Deloitte 
and Touche 2008), however, have shown that a grow-
ing percentage of managers worldwide are interested 
in applying risk management more proactively and 
holistically. Yet, despite the benefits gained by apply-
ing risk management to enhance risk responsiveness 
(e.g. COSO 2004) and strategic decision-making (e.g. 
Hoyt and Liebenberg 2011), an over-abundance of risk 
management processes may be problematic as well, 
in the sense that it may overload the organization 
with too much time-consuming control and bureau-
cracy (cf. Taran, Boer and Lindgren 2013). Thus, 
although risk management is important, finding the 
right balance between risk and risk management is a 
serious challenge.
Risk appetite is “the total impact of risk an organiza-
tion is prepared to accept in the pursuit of its strategic 
objectives” (KPMG 2009, p. 3). HM Treasury (2006, p.3) 
developed a risk appetite scale, which aims at helping 
companies to map various possible impact categories 
(e.g. reputation and credibility; operational and policy 
delivery; financial and legal/regulatory compliance) and 
to determine their corporate risk appetite on a scale 
ranging from: 
1. Averse – Avoidance of risk and uncertainty is a key 
objective.
2. Minimalist – Low degree of inherent risk, but with 
a limited potential of reward.
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3. Cautious – Preference for safe options that have a 
low degree of residual risk.
4. Open – Willing to consider all options and choose 
the one that is most likely to result in successful 
delivery.
5. Hungry – Eager to be innovative and to choose 
options based on potentially higher rewards. 
A Business Model Innovativeness Scale 1
Through the years, essentially three approaches have 
been proposed to measure innovativeness. The first 
approach, associated with business model innovation 
radicality, considers business model innovation as a 
radical change in the way a company does business 
(Chesbrough 2007, Linder and Cantrell 2000). Linder 
and Cantrell in particular clearly attempt to draw a line 
in suggesting what can and cannot be defined as busi-
ness model innovation. 
The second approach defines innovativeness in terms 
of, what might be called, the reach of the innovation 
(e.g., Rogers 1983, Garcia and Calantone 2002). A suit-
able scale measures the degree to which an innovation 
in terms of “new to whom”, which could range from 
new to the company, via new to the market and new to 
the industry, to new to the world.
The third approach considers measuring the innovative-
ness of a new business model through its complexity, 
where any change in any of the (core) building blocks 
or the relationships between them could be considered 
as a form of business model innovation (Amit and Zott 
2001; Osterwalder, Pigneur and Tucci 2004; Magretta 
2002). In line with Abell (1980) and Skarzynski and Gib-
son (2008), business model innovation could then be 
considered in terms of the number of building blocks 
that are changed simultaneously: any change in one of 
the building blocks would constitute a simple innova-
tion, while simultaneous changes in all of the building 
blocks would be the most complex form of business 
model innovation.
If these three approaches are combined, a three-
dimensional space, first proposed by Taran, Boer and 
Lindberg (2008) and later published in Taran et al. 
1 Most of this section is from Taran, Boer and Lindgren (2015), with 
permission from the authors.
(2015), emerges, which helps in qualifying the innova-
tiveness of a new business model (Figure 1):
• Radicality – How new (incremental vs. radical) 
is each building block (see Table 1 for different 
examples). 
• Reach – To whom is the innovation new?
• Complexity – Number of building blocks changed 
simultaneously.
Figure 1: A Three-Dimensional (Business Model) Innovativeness Scale (Source: Taran et al. 2015)
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Figure 1: A Three-Dimensional (Business Model) Innovativeness 
Scale (Source: Taran et al. 2015)
In this space, any business model innovation can be 
positioned in terms of its degree of radicality, reach 
and complexity. Some changes are more radical and/
or complex than others, and some (e.g. radical prod-
uct innovation, incremental process improvement) are 
better understood than others (e.g. a holistic, new to 
the world departure from all business models known 
so far). 
Research objective
The basic assumption behind this paper is that the 
risks involved in business model innovation increase 
with the radicality, reach and complexity of the innova-
tion. While risk, risk appetite, risk management and, 
to a certain extent, business model innovativeness 
and innovation management are relatively well-estab-
lished constructs, their role and interaction in business 
model innovation processes are not well understood. 
The objective of this paper is to investigate how these 
constructs interact to affect the eventual outcome of 
a business model innovation process, in terms of its 
“success” or “failure”.
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Research Design
Case Studies Description
Four retrospective case studies of business model inno-
vation processes undertaken by three industrial compa-
nies (Table 2) provide the empirical basis for this paper. 
The companies were selected based on their relatively 
successful, yet somewhat different, business model 
innovation experiences over the years, and focused on 
the, in total four, cases in which they failed to imple-
ment their new business model attempts successfully. 
Data gathering techniques 
Given the exploratory nature of this research, the case 
study methodology was adopted (Yin 2003). Multi-
ple qualitative data gathering methods were used 
to ensure the validity and reliability of the research. 
The desk research involved gathering of information 
through books, articles, websites, as well as docu-
ments received from the three companies. The field 
research consisted of semi-structured interviews (for 
interview guide see Appendix A), e-mail correspond-
ence and company visits. The questionnaire used to 
guide the interviews covered all six constructs (busi-
ness model innovativeness, innovation management, 
risk, risk appetite, risk management, success/failure) 
plus contextual variables (e.g. company background, 
strategy, open/network-based innovation) and was 
semi-structured in order to allow the respondents 
maximum freedom to explain their views on the new 
business model and their understanding of the inno-
vation process, and the researchers the possibility to 
discover unexpected yet relevant issues. The inter-
views were held with the companies’ middle manag-
ers (e.g. technology/innovation, product, project or 
marketing managers). 
Building block
Incremental innovation
“Do what we do but better”
Radical innovation
“Do something different”
Value proposition Offering “more of the same” Offering something different (at least to the 
company)
Target customer Existing market New market
Customer relationship Continuous improvements of existing channels New relationship channels (e.g. physical/vir-
tual, personal/peers/ mass awareness)
Value chain architecture Exploitation (e.g. internal, lean, continuous 
improvements)
Exploration (e.g. open, flexible, diversified)
Core competences Familiar competences (e.g. improvement of  
existing technology) 
Disruptive new, unfamiliar, competences  
(e.g. new emerging technology)
Partner network Familiar (fixed) network New (dynamic) networks (e.g. alliance, 
joint-venture) 
Profit formula Existing processes to generate revenues  
followed-by/or incremental processes  
of (cost) retrenchments
New processes to generate revenues fol-
lowed-by/or disruptive processes of (cost) 
retrenchments
Table 1: Incremental and Radical Orientation to Each Building Block (Source: Taran et al. 2015)
Alpha Beta Gamma
Large global 
company, which 
is specialized 
in developing, 
manufacturing 
and marketing 
(for the most part) 
professional audio 
products
Large global 
company, special-
ized in developing, 
manufacturing and 
marketing flexible 
electrical/elec-
tronic control and 
instrumentation 
solutions within 
power produc-
tion, marine and 
offshore
Large IT company, 
which is specialized 
in providing IT solu-
tions for primarily 
public organizations
Two failure cases 
(A and B)
One failure case (C) One failure case (D)
Table 2: Company Descriptions
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In Alpha, 18 hours of interviews were conducted, and 
in Beta seven hours of interviews in total. In Gamma, 
the interviewees represented the eleven organizations 
involved in that company’s business model innovation. 
More than 25 hours of interviews were recorded. 
Analytical Focus
The cross-case analysis focused on identifying and 
analyzing the similarities and differences between 
the four focal business model innovation experiences. 
In order to increase the credibility of the research, the 
data gathering and analysis of all cases focused on the 
following, theory based, criteria:
• Characteristics of the business model innovations, 
in terms of radicality (how new?), reach (new to 
whom?) and complexity (Table 1 and Figure 1).
• Overall innovation management. Here, the innova-
tion process of each company was analyzed using 
Tidd and Bessant’s (2009) innovation model of 
“Search-Select-Implement”. 
• Risk, risk appetite and risk management, including 
the analysis of: 1) both strategic and operational 
risks occurring, 2) the risk appetite of each company 
over the years, and 3) the way risks were managed 
(e.g. explicitly, implicitly, stage-gate oriented).  
• Fit. Looking for the interaction between the busi-
ness model characteristics, overall innovation 
management, risk, risk appetite, risk management 
and the outcomes (success/failure) of the business 
model innovation process, the analysis particularly 
focused on the “fit” between these constructs, rea-
soning that the higher the risk appetite of a com-
pany, the higher the likelihood that it will pursue a 
more innovative business model, which will involve 
greater risk which, in turn, needs to be managed 
more tightly in order for the new business model to 
be realized and become a success.
Given the exploratory character of the case studies, 
additional criteria emerging from the case studies were 
also actively sought, but not found.
Data Gathering Results
Table 3 summarizes the case study data gathered. As 
that table illustrates, the cross-case analysis focused 
on the selection of dimensions describing similarities 
and differences between the three companies’ experi-
ences (e.g. Eisenhardt 1989). 
Cross-case analysis and Proposition 
Development
The cross-case analysis produced six propositions, 
which are organized according to the four criteria for-
mulated above.
Characteristics of the Business Model 
Innovation and Success Rate
Company Alpha: Throughout the years, company 
Alpha engaged in seven business model innovations. 
Four cases were very successful2, one case partly suc-
ceeded, and in two cases, the company failed to suc-
ceed (cases A and B). The successful cases involved the 
exploitation of existing technology, or the development 
and exploitation of new technology-based products, 
together with a partner, in a market segment new to 
company Alpha. The two failure cases, presented here, 
were attempts to outsource marketing and sales (case 
A) and production (case B), respectively, to a third party. 
Two factors caused their failure. First, the partner did 
not match the company’s high quality standards. Sec-
ond, they realized in a later phase (particularly case A) 
that the market was too small to play a significant part 
in the company’s turnover (i.e. low reach). 
Company Beta: Over the years, this company engaged 
in three business model innovations experiences, two 
of which became a success, while one attempt failed 
(case C). The successful cases involved the application 
of existing, and the development of new, competences 
and technologies for a new market segment, followed 
by an acquisition. These innovations were rather risky 
for the company, both in terms of investment as well 
as time constraints, and involved the development 
and exploitation of new technology for a new market 
segment. In case C, a failure, the company “pushed” a 
self-developed radically new product into the market 
in an attempt to exploit a new emerging technology, 
2 The success of the business model innovations was measured 
by their profitability, where successful cases were highly profitable 
for the company, partly successful cases were the ones with small 
profit margins, and failure cases were those who failed to bring any 
profits, or worse. See Taran et al. (2015) for more information on the 
successful cases of companies Alpha and Beta. 
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Alpha Beta Gamma
The four failure 
business model 
innovation cases
• Case A – New business unit offering 
existing technology-based products 
to a new market (studios), plus out-
sourcing of marketing and sales to 
a partner (low radicality, low reach, 
high complexity).
• Case B – Outsourcing the manu-
facturing of one of the products 
– failure (low radicality, low reach, 
high complexity).
• Case C – New technology-based product, 
aimed at serving existing and potential 
new customer segments. After one year 
of heavy investment in the product, the 
project was terminated due to incongru-
ity with customer demands (product 
shape and size; price – too expen-
sive) – (low radicality, low reach, high 
complexity).
• Case D – New IT solution based on 
approaching shift in technological 
opportunities within metering utility 
consumption. The project was termi-
nated due to strategic shift within 
the company and lack of believe in 
customer demand (high radicality, 
high reach, high complexity, given the 
difficulty in network structure among 
the participating organizations). 
Overall innovation 
management
Search processes - No search process in 
any of the cases. “It was just something 
that came up along the way”. One pro-
ject was managed proactively in search 
of a radically new business model (Case 
B). Otherwise, it was internal compe-
tences chosen to be used elsewhere.
Selection and implementation pro-
cesses - Following a stage-gate model, 
radical innovation ideas are handled 
with extra awareness. A slower process, 
which always starts with small steps 
and then grows slowly. Radical ideas fol-
low gates similar to those of incremen-
tal ideas. The difference is, though, that 
it takes more time to move from gate 
to gate.
Search processes – Recognized as one of the 
weaknesses of the company. They do not 
really have any systematic processes to man-
age radical, or even incremental, innovation 
ideas. It is something that usually just “pops 
up”.  They give more attention to ideas that 
come from their main customers.
Selection and implementation processes 
- A stage-gate model is used to move the 
business concept idea through a maturity 
roadmap and development process. Many 
complaints about the fact that there is 
not enough market research behind ideas 
proposed. In effect, lacking understanding of 
the potential market and sales volume.
Search processes –
Initial idea developed by area director 
of the company. In continuation of this 
initial idea, ten additional organizations 
were involved into the further develop-
ment of the business idea and the busi-
ness model underlying the project.
Selection and implementation 
processes – An open, network-based 
approach to develop and test the busi-
ness idea. A development process, which 
was marked by a substantial number of 
iterations and radical shifts in the overall 
business model.
Risk, risk 
appetite and risk 
management
Used to be between “open” and “hun-
gry”. Currently moving towards “open” 
– “cautious”, and taking fewer risks. 
Intending to move to ‘hungry’ again in 
future.
No explicit risk management pro-
cesses, but rather a project culture 
and a project/ innovation model that 
is structured by many gates aimed 
at continuity and reducing the risks 
throughout the innovation process. It 
is not an advanced risk management 
model, or one that applies a risk assess-
ment method, but nonetheless a very 
sufficient model to reduce many risks 
through the innovation process.
Used to be between “cautious’ and “open”. 
Moving towards “open” and “hungry”. Willing 
to take chances and aim high, but aware of 
the risks involved in that.
No explicit risk management processes were 
identified. However, their innovation pro-
cesses are highly controlled, to insure that 
strategic decisions made at the gates are 
being implemented adequately at the stages 
throughout the innovation process, and, the 
company considers those control processes 
as a form of risk reduction.
Mostly “averse” but moving towards 
an “open” approach. Focusing on a new 
market position in the aftermath of a 
privatization process.
No explicit risk management processes 
were identified. Yet, they perceived the 
openness approach as a form of risk miti-
gation and sharing, by opening up both 
the business model and its innovation 
process, which would be the fundament 
of the project. The company stated 
that the project was not so much an 
internal development project, but rather 
something, in which all the participating 
organizations should be able to mirror 
themselves (i.e. risk sharing).
Fit None None None
Table 3: Summary of the Case Data
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without any idea of how customers would respond. The 
market place failed to pick up the new product.
Company Gamma: This company was very eager to 
meet the new challenges of a post-privatization period 
(during the innovation project the ownership of com-
pany Gamma shifted from a number of different public 
organizations to an investment fund). The company 
had little experience with business model innovation, 
since it had always relied on a familiar and fixed group 
of customers within the public sector. Actually, the tar-
get customers of the company were to a large extent 
also the company’s owners. Consequently, case D actu-
ally concerned a fundamental innovation experimenta-
tion for company Gamma.   
Table 4 provides more details on the data gathered 
by visualizing the business model innovation cases 
through their degrees of innovativeness in terms of 
radicality, reach and complexity.
On the aggregate scale combining radicality, reach and 
complexity, cases A, B and C were low in radicality and 
reach. Case D, however, was high in radicality and reach. 
All cases were highly complex. Case A involved the 
establishment of a new business unit offering incre-
mental improvements to existing products, combined 
with outsourcing of marketing and sales to a partner. 
Case B concerned outsourcing of manufacturing to a 
partner which, however, failed to result in a competitive 
product. Alpha was a highly competent design com-
pany, pushing new products into the marketplace and 
with a successful history of collaborative technology 
development. However, they seemed to have under-
estimated the complexities involved in establishing a 
successful operational collaboration through outsourc-
ing. In Beta, new product development activities were 
usually based on market-pull. Case C failed because 
the company “pushed” a radically new product into 
the market without any idea of how customers would 
respond. Gamma’s case D was a radical and new to the 
industry innovation, which went far beyond the com-
pany’s previous innovation experiences.
Moreover, the case studies suggest that business model 
innovation failures are situated at the “extremes” of: 1) 
low radicality and reach, and 2) high radicality and reach.
 
Proposition 1:   Even if the radicality and reach of a busi-
ness model innovation are low, compa-
nies may underestimate its complexity, 
particularly if the innovation does not 
build on the company’s experiences with 
previous innovations.
Proposition 2:  If a company does not have the disrup-
tive exploration capabilities and com-
mitment required to support a radically 
new and high reach business model 
innovation, the innovation process is 
likely to fail.
Yet, however tempting it may be to propose that com-
panies best stay away from the extremes, the more 
compelling reason for these failures seems to be the 
lack of prior related knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 
1990). Alpha was a technology developer, without any 
experience with operational collaboration. Beta under-
stood how to translate market requirements into new 
products, but did not understand how to push new 
technology into the market place. Gamma overplayed 
its hand by trying to accomplish a new to the indus-
try innovation, which went far beyond its previous 
experiences.
Case
Radicality (to the core 
business) Reach
Complexity (to the core 
business)
Alfa
Case –A Low: VP; PN Low: new to the company High: VP; TC; VC; PN; CR; PF
Case – B Low: VC; PN Low: new to the company High: VP; TC; VC; CC; PN; PF
Beta Case – C Low: VP; TC Low: new to the company High: VP; TC; CC; VC; PN; CR; PF
Gamma Case – D High: VP; TC; VC; PN High: new to the industry High: VP, TC, VC, PN, PF
VP=value proposition; TC=target customer; VC=value chain; CC=core competences, CR=customer relation;  
PN=partner network; PF=profit formula.
Table 4: Radicality, Reach and Complexity of the Four Cases
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Overall Innovation Management
Company Alpha: In most business model innovations 
ventured by this company, there was never a search 
process for new business models. Rather, ideas were 
slowly developed along the way based on the com-
pany’s existing core competences (e.g. technologies, 
know-how). The company simply considered it obvious 
that existing competences would give them relatively 
easy access to other industrial settings. It seems that 
the company had a prevalence for generating an idea, 
testing it first internally, starting with a low scale pro-
duction process, and considering growth in due course 
(e.g., through a joint venture, or a new business unit). 
This inside-out replication of previous business model 
innovation processes seemed to be a winning formula 
for the company, and was expected to work in any 
(future) business model innovations. However, in cases 
A and B, one of the key challenges for the company 
was to find the right partner to work with, and here the 
company failed. 
Company Beta: Just like company Alpha, company Beta 
never implemented a formal search process for new 
business models. Radically new ideas emerged in the 
course of time, either through existing technological 
development capabilities, cost reduction programs, or 
as a reaction to emerging  competitors’ technologies, 
which was the trigger of case C. The failure of case C, 
caused by a pure “technology push” strategy, made the 
management team even more aware of the need to 
understand customer demands as a basis for selecting 
future innovation ideas. 
Company Gamma: The innovation process was 
marked by a rather wide and creative search for new 
business models. At an early stage, company Gamma 
realized that the developed concept would be marked 
by a significant level of complexity, which would go 
beyond the complexity of the products and services 
the company had produced hitherto. The entire net-
work of organizations involved in the project was 
invited to a co-creation process in order to enable 
them to mirror themselves in the final outcome of 
the process. The two project managers of company 
Gamma (there was a shift during the process) and 
the area director who initiated the project, explicitly 
stated that the intention was to invite everybody into 
the process. Both project managers were willing to 
accept the inherent risks of this open innovation (cf. 
Bogers, Chesbrough, Heaton and Teece 2019) process 
experimentation (e.g. the risk of knowledge spill-over 
to potential competitors; the risk of one of the partici-
pating organizations to be inspired and develop their 
own solutions without the participation of company 
Gamma). Sadly, though, this high level of inherent risk 
acceptance did not work to their benefit. The business 
model innovation failed and in the aftermath com-
pany Gamma chose to reduce its network and be more 
cautious, i.e. accept less risk. 
In all three cases, results indicate that experimenta-
tion, learning from previous experiences and using the 
lessons learned, have significant impact on the success 
(or failure) of business model innovation.
Proposition 3:  Insufficient experimentation and lack 
of learning from failures increase the 
likelihood of business model innovation 
failure. 
Risk, Risk Appetite and Risk Management
Company Alpha: The company’s risk appetite used to 
be “hungry”, but they gradually took fewer risks and 
moved towards “cautious”. In the past, the company 
was more willing to take risks, and experimented with 
new, rather than “more of the same”, products and 
business models. However, due to a significant down-
turn in the company’s profits during the last couple of 
years, which was partly related to the financial crisis 
and resulted in the hiring of a new CEO, the strategy of 
the company changed significantly and, with that, also 
its risk appetite.
The innovation process of the company was very struc-
tured and followed many gates. The process and gates 
were the same for all innovations. The company did not 
apply any explicit risk assessment/management pro-
cesses. Rather, they considered the gates as (implicit) 
risk reduction processes: all ongoing business develop-
ment projects had to meet each requirement at each 
gate before green light was given to proceed to the 
next stage. An additional mechanism used to reduce 
risks was associated with time. That is, despite the fact 
that the innovation process and the gates remained 
the same for all types of innovations, the time taken 
to move from gate to gate increased as the level of 
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radicality, reach and/or complexity increased. This gave 
the company the flexibility to proceed with more cau-
tion and to terminate projects that were expected to 
be unsuccessful without too many consequences. Yet, 
it was also apparent to the management team that 
despite the fact that the decision-making and imple-
mentation processes were well designed for techno-
logical success, the company did not really possessed 
adequate processes to predict the possible success in 
the market place, that is, commercial success. Conse-
quently, the management team was very keen to search 
for new, more structured ways to deal with risk-benefit 
projections and increase the likelihood of commercial 
success of future innovations. Those new processes, 
according to the company’s innovation director, are not 
meant to increase control but rather to reduce uncer-
tainty as regards future sales.
Company Beta: The company used to focus on elec-
tronics and instruments that were used in switch-
boards in factories. It was very traditionally oriented, 
and had relied upon North Europe as its sales market. 
The company’s risk appetite used to lay somewhere 
between “cautious” and “open”, but had grown signifi-
cantly since the early nineties and was leaning towards 
“open” and “hungry” at the time of the study. This 
is partly due to a replacement of the senior manage-
ment, but also because sales volume had grown and 
new technologies had emerged that opened up new 
opportunities for the company. Willing to take chances, 
the company was aiming high, even though they were 
aware of the risks involved.
Company Beta did not have an explicit risk management 
process in place. Instead, with each gate, the company 
set a high level of control requirements. In doing so, deci-
sion makers did not question the risks involved the inno-
vation process, but rather insured that decisions made 
will be efficiently executed (e.g. investments, resources, 
time). Thus, unlike company Alpha, which gave the 
innovation team the flexibility to manage the stages 
freely from gate to gate, in company Beta, the control 
processes were very formal, continued also through the 
stages from gate to gate, but did not consider any risks. 
According to one of the managers, the innovation 
processes involved a lot of paperwork and forced the 
innovation team to spend a lot of time on completing 
checklists instead of managing the process forward, 
which, however, had very little impact on output 
effectiveness. In its technological innovation projects, 
company Beta used scenario planning. Performed by 
the business intelligence unit, this method involved 
the development of three sales forecast scenarios: 
an optimistic, a realistic, and a conservative sce-
nario. These scenarios used to assist the company 
with analyzing the actual “as-is” business progress 
(e.g. better than expected, as-planned, worse than 
expected). However, those scenarios were not applied 
in any of the business model innovation processes.
Company Gamma: Historically, this company serviced 
a substantial number of customers within the public 
sector. The strategic focus was not to expand the mar-
ket or to innovate products and services. Instead the 
primary goal of the company was to stick to the cur-
rent customers, products and services. This risk-averse 
approach to business modeling and innovation was 
revised as a consequence of the privatization of com-
pany Gamma. The privatization process ran in parallel 
with the innovation project and drove the initial stages 
of the project in terms of involving external organiza-
tions in the innovation process and the development of 
the business model. 
Company Gamma did not have an explicit risk manage-
ment process in place either. Yet, unlike the other two 
companies, the company was willing to accept, that is, 
to tolerate, a substantial risk during the entire innova-
tion process. They saw the involvement of some of the 
potential customers (the utility companies) as a way to 
minimize the risk if a failure outcome should occur. Fur-
thermore, it was very important for the company to have 
the customers “on board” to ensure market fit to the pro-
ject objective. In effect, here too, risk mitigation activities 
were only partly and, then, implicitly initiated. The area 
director addressed this issue by stating that the end-
result of this open innovation process could potentially 
result in little to no positive impact to the organization 
overall and possibly even with an (affordable) loss. This 
“all-in” gambling by the company was often mentioned 
during the network meetings, and the project manag-
ers as well as the area director emphasized that the pro-
ject should not be perceived as a “Gamma project” but 
rather as a “network project”, which consisted of all the 
organizations involved. The project was closed down as a 
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consequence of a strategic shift within company Gamma. 
A new area director sought to get an overview of the vari-
ous projects within the business area. He did not see any 
potential in this particular project, nor a fit between this 
project and the newly-planned overall strategy, closed 
down the project and fired the project manager.
In all three companies, the top management risk appe-
tite had a strong but different impact on the compa-
ny’s corporate risk appetite. While the replacement of 
the CEO in company Beta, and the privatization pro-
cess that took place in company Gamma turned both 
companies to be risk hungrier in their pursuit of new 
business opportunities, Alpha’s experience made the 
company more risk averse.
Proposition 4:   The top management has great influ-
ence on the risk appetite of the com-
pany. Fit between the corporate strategy 
of a company and top management’s 
risk appetite should be one of the selec-
tion criteria for top managers.
However, in none of the three companies an explicit 
risk management program was in place. Risks were 
managed implicitly, that is, embedded in the inno-
vation stage-gate process design (companies Alpha 
and, to a lesser degree, Beta), or not managed at all 
(company Gamma). In effect, problems continued to 
manifest themselves in different ways. At the time, 
many of these problems seemed to have a tolerable 
impact along the process, e.g. unexpected but solvable 
surprises; goals and objectives that required redefini-
tion during the process; accepted solutions that were 
rejected in a later phase; implemented solutions that 
were less effective or glamorous than anticipated; and/
or schedule and budget overruns. Yet, the cumulative 
effect resulted in the business model innovation pro-
ject to fail in all four cases. Clearly, the companies were 
unhappy with their risk mitigation processes, but none 
of them had any solution – they did not really know, 
and never learned, how to optimize the process and, 
particularly, how to manage risk proactively.
Proposition 5:  The absence of dedicated risk manage-
ment program to a business model inno-
vation initiative increases the likelihood 
of the initiative to fail. 
The interaction Between Risk, Risk Appetite, 
Risk Management, And The Role Of Risk 
Awareness
On an aggregate level, the four failure cases indicate 
that risk (due to the business model innovativeness), 
risk appetite and risk management and, more impor-
tantly, the interaction between these constructs, play 
a significant role in the success or failure of business 
model innovation initiatives. 
The concept of interaction or “fit” plays a central role 
in various theories, including manufacturing strategy 
(e.g. Skinner 1985), organization theory (e.g. Mintzberg 
1979) and innovation theory (e.g. Boer and During 2001), 
but has not been used so far to understand the rela-
tionships between business model innovation and risk 
management. Miles and Snow (1994), for example, dis-
cuss the dynamics of internal-external fit. They argue 
that “minimal fit” is necessary to ensure a company’s 
survival, “tight fit” frequently results in excellent 
administration, while “early fit” may enable a company 
to sustain an unusually high level of performance over 
an extended period of time. Yet, they were also aware 
of the fact that “fit” has its limitations as well – even 
“Hall of Fame” companies may suffer from downturns 
in performance (e.g. due to unexpected external hazard 
impact). 
In cases A, B and C, companies Alpha and Beta were 
“open” to take risk, but although the business model 
innovations they pursued were relatively complex, they 
were also rather incremental and new to the company 
only, i.e. low reach (Table 4) and, in effect, low risk ini-
tiatives. Neither company applied any risk manage-
ment mitigation activities. In case D, it was company 
Gamma’s limited risk awareness that seems to have led 
to complacency when it ran a highly innovative (radi-
cal change, new to the industry, complex; Table 4), i.e. 
a high-risk, initiative. In effect, the company did not 
apply any risk management either. In short, the compa-
nies’ risk appetite and awareness, the innovativeness 
of, and, consequently, risk associated with, the busi-
ness model innovations pursued and, finally, the effort 
the companies put into risk management, did not fit 
together.
Although it can be argued that a perfect fit between 
risk, risk appetite, risk awareness, risk management 
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and business model innovativeness will not automati-
cally ensure business model innovation success (and 
vice versa), it will increase the probability of success 
substantially. Both Alpha and Beta had multiple suc-
cessful business model innovation experiences in their 
past, and it has been observed (e.g. Taran et al. 2015) 
that fit, particularly between the companies’ risk appe-
tite and the business models’ innovativeness and asso-
ciated risks, was much better in the successful cases 
than in the failure cases. For example, in its success-
ful attempts (e.g. a new joint venture; new business 
unit development), company Alpha built slack (e.g. Gal-
braith 1973) into the process by taking more time to get 
from gate to gate as the level of radicality, reach and/or 
complexity increased. This gave the company the flex-
ibility to proceed with more caution and to terminate 
those projects that were expected to be unsuccessful 
without too many consequences. In addition, company 
Alfa also mapped each innovation project’s timetable 
as red, yellow or green to illustrate both its readiness to 
meet the next gate requirements deadline, as well as 
the sense of urgency for its process completion. 
The results indicate that compared to incremental, 
low reach and simple business model innovations, the 
importance of ensuring alignment between a com-
pany’s risk appetite, risk awareness and risk manage-
ment approach increases in more radical, higher reach 
and more complex business model innovations.
Proposition 6:  The likelihood of launching a success-
ful new business model increases if the 
company’s risk appetite, risk awareness, 
the innovativeness of the new busi-
ness model, and the risk management 
approach adopted, align with the risks 
associated with the intended innovation.
Conclusion
Despite two decades of intense research, business 
model innovation still lacks a solid theoretical basis, 
particularly with respect to the antecedents, contin-
gencies, and outcomes (Foss and Saebi 2017). In this 
paper, we focused on how the risks associated with 
the innovativeness of a business model innovation 
initiative, an organization’s risk appetite, and its risk 
management approach interact to affect the success 
or failure of a business model innovation process.
Contribution 
The cross-case analysis produced six testable proposi-
tions. Together, these propositions seem to suggest 
the following picture.
Risk appetite and risk awareness seem to play a signifi-
cant role in business model innovation decision-mak-
ing. The top management’s personality, risk appetite, 
and assessment of the company’s economic position 
and outlook overall, tend to have great influence on 
selecting new business model innovation initiatives. 
As such, it is imperative for companies to consider 
whether the various internal stakeholders’ and also 
external partners’ risk appetites and awareness are 
aligned, in order to reduce the likelihood of future con-
flicts when designing the company’s innovation port-
folio. This proposition is also confirmed by, for example, 
Rogers (1983), who argued for the important role that 
key stakeholders’ perceptions have in “setting the 
innovation stage”.
Additionally, it is vital to consider the strategic aggres-
siveness as part of business model innovation decision-
making. Top management perception greatly affects its 
appreciation of the nature of the innovation, and may 
lead to underestimation of the difficulties involved, 
even, or perhaps especially, at the two business model 
innovation extremes of: 
• Incremental (radicality), new-to-the-company only 
(reach), but highly complex business model innova-
tions initiatives. Risk-averse managers may have 
the impression (possibly, illusion) of “safe enough” 
business model experimentation, but may risk that 
the innovation will have little or no positive impact 
in the market place.
• Radical, new-to-the-industry or new-to-the-world 
(reach), highly complex business model innova-
tions, which in most cases depart from the com-
pany’s previous strategy and do not, consequently, 
allow building on experiences with previous 
innovations. 
Although the likelihood of failure seems to be largest 
at these extremes, they are fundamentally different, 
so that it is quite important to distinguish between 
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the two. The first can be considered to reflect a reac-
tive strategy (cases A, B, and C), whereas the second 
is a much more proactive initiative (case D). Being too 
defensive and, in effect, unambitious may lead to 
failure, while pursuing a proactive initiative requires 
managers to appreciate the high uncertainties and 
the consequent risks inherent in the process, which 
in many cases go beyond the scope of the compa-
ny’s existing core competences and capabilities and 
requires non-prior related knowledge (cf. Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990).
Companies should not overlook the importance of 
learning from failure either. There are many lessons 
to be learnt from the aftermath of a failed attempt in 
terms of what not to do and what to improve on for 
a next time. Sadly, the cases presented here indicate 
that due to locked-in path dependency trajectories 
(Nelson and Winter 1982), companies tend to “simply” 
repeat successful business model innovation processes 
and to, equally “simply”, drop unsuccessful approaches, 
rather than learning from them.  The inherent danger is 
that a company fails to learn how to approach innova-
tions that are essentially new to the company, which, 
in turn, may decrease its growth potential significantly.
Taking a risk management and alignment perspective, 
even if 1) a company’s risk appetite and awareness fits 
its economic position and outlook, and 2) the company 
estimates the nature and characteristics (radicality, 
complexity, reach) of the intended innovation correctly, 
and 3) the company is prepared, if necessary, to learn 
new approaches, business model innovation is still 
loaded with risks. Hence, risk management and, more 
importantly, its alignment with the other key con-
structs (i.e. the actual risk associated with the inno-
vativeness of the business model innovation and the 
company’s risk appetite) is of paramount importance in 
any business model innovation process. Furthermore, 
it appears that adopting a widely used approach such 
as the stage-gate process (Cooper 1993) to manage a 
business model innovation process is not enough. The 
three companies’ experiences suggest that incorporat-
ing dedicated risk management processes (Chapman 
and Ward 2004) in a business model innovation pro-
cess, whether that process is stage-gate driven or not, 
can help reduce the likelihood of innovation failure. 
Moreover, as case C suggests, risk management can 
also potentially facilitate meeting customer demands. 
Too much focus on technological aspects combined 
with insufficient attention for commercial aspects and, 
possibly, a “push” strategy, may lead to technical suc-
cess but commercial failure (cf. e.g. Voss 1988).
Further Research
The empirical investigation performed in this research 
involved four retrospective case studies, based on 
mostly qualitative data. There are several well-doc-
umented advantages to this methodology, such as 
richness and depth, but also weaknesses related to, 
amongst others, generalization. Accordingly, the case 
study results and propositions developed here should 
be tested on a larger scale, using a mix of comparative 
and longitudinal case studies as a first step, aimed at 
enriching, sharpening and adding to the propositions 
presented here. Thereafter a larger case or question-
naire-based survey may be used to test and generalize 
the propositions developed.
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW GUIDE
Only the questions relevant to this paper are listed here. Company information (e.g., location, size, structure, prod-
ucts, and markets) were inferred from company documents and checked with the interviewees.
Core constructs Interview questions
Characteristics of 
the business model 
innovation:
1. How many business model innovations did the company experiment with over the past couple of years?
2. From a business model perspective, what did these innovations involve, i.e. which building blocks were 
changed?
3. Please map each of the business model innovation initiatives according to the three-dimensional innovative-
ness space (Figure 1 in the paper).
Overall innovation 
management:
4. How many of those business model innovations were successful, partly successful or a failure?
5. Why did you choose to engage in each of these business model innovations? Was it a response to some kind 
of threat (reactive), or did you take advantage from an emerging opportunity (proactive)? Which of the inno-
vations would you rate as ‘idea push’, which as ‘market pull’?
6. Who made the choice for each of those innovations (e.g. R&D manager, management team, stakeholders)?
7. The rationality of choices: Based on what data analysis did you make the choice (e.g. cost-benefit financial 
analysis, business plan, “gut feeling”)?
8. Did you apply similar innovation processes to all innovations (incremental/radical) or different ones?
Risk, risk appetite, 
risk management 
and interactions 
between constructs:
9. Based on the table below, how would you characterize the company?
How [risk] hungry is the company? Description
Averse We never take risks
Minimalist Preference for extra safe options that have a low, or no, degree of risk and 
only have a potential for limited reward.
Cautious Preference for somewhat safe options that have a low degree of risk and 
may only have limited potential for reward.
Open Willing to consider all options and choose the one that is most likely to 
result in successful delivery while also providing an acceptable level of 
reward (despite medium level of risks that we need to take through the 
innovation process).
Hungry Eager to be innovative and to choose options based on potential higher 
rewards (despite greater risk).
HM Treasury (2006)
10. How, if at all, were risk management processes used through the business model innovation process?
11. To what extent did you consider through the innovation process the interaction between the level of risk, and 
the way you chose to organize for each business model innovation?
12. What did you learn from that experience for next time?
In case the innova-
tion process involved 
open/network-based 
innovation:
13. How do you experience your organization's attitude / openness to formal / informal networks?
14. What did you perceive as the theme of the network (how clearly it was formulated)?
15. Based on what criteria were partners selected (past relationships, brand new partners, strategic options / 
limitations, customer base, partners' existing technology)?
16. Who was leading the network – how (positive/negative) did you experience his/her role?
17. What was your overall experience of the network meetings - progress/non-progress?
18. If you look back on the course of the network – can you point to any key times, meetings, events, etc. where 
the network/innovation project took a decisive turn?
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